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§ 1. Introduction
In 1963 an article by P. A.M. Dirac appeared in Scientific American which
commented upon the role of aesthetic factors in scientific practice.' The
article suggests that aesthetic factors are important not only in directing the
line of scientists' research, but also in permitting the evaluation of the
theories formulated by that work according to the degree of their aesthetic
worth. That these two roles of aesthetic factors were for Dirac indissolubly
linked is shown by his treatment. He makes it clear, for instance, that the
strategy of choosing those theories for pursuit which afforded aesthetic
satisfaction is for him inseparable from the subsequent practice of evaluat-
ing theories in part upon their possession of aesthetic qualities:
It is more important to have beauty in one's equations than to have them fit experiment. [. . .] It
seems that if one is working from the point of view of getting beauty in one's equations, and if one has
really a sound insight, one is on a sure line of progress.2
Passages of Dirac's article are frequently cited in discussions of scientific
methodology.3 Many authors, however, reproduce the text only to cast
' An account of Dirac's life and work is offered in Dalitz and Peierls, 1986. Reminiscences of and
comments on Dirac's work appear in Kursunoglu and Wigner Eds.. 1987. and in J.G. Taylor Ed.,
1987.
2 Dirac, 1963, p. 47.
' Passages from Dirac, 1963, are quoted in e.g. Osborne, pp. 160-1, 1964 and p. 292, 1984, Holton,
pp. 255-6, 1973, Wechsler, p. 5, 1978, Barrow, p. 350, 1988a, and Simonton, pp. 192-3. 1988.
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doubt on its cogency, and in particular to deny the unity which Dirac
asserted between the heuristic and the evaluative functions of aesthetic
factors in science. While many writers, as we shall see, are quite happy to
admit that scientific research may be spurred and guided partly by aesthetic
concerns, they dismiss Dirac's suggestion that aesthetic factors can be of use
too in the evaluation of theories. For instance, J.D. Barrow questions
whether any sense can be discerned in Dirac's views on this matter:
Is Dirac saying anything sensible about aesthetics when he argues that it is of paramount importance
to have 'beauty' in one's equations, or is he merely revealing a rather limited personal experience and
appreciation of things other than equations?4
O.K. Simonton, for his part, seems to rule out that, whatever Dirac wrote
about the topic, he could ever have applied his own injunctions and sub-
jected a theory to an aesthetic evaluation: 'No scientist, including Dirac,
would ever be so bold as to justify a theory on so irrational a basis as
"beauty".'5 There appears abroad, in short, some reluctance to assign
sensible content to an important part of Dirac's methodological writings.
This paper argues that Dirac's views on the evaluative use of aesthetic
criteria are on the contrary cogent and well-founded, and carry consid-
erable interest for the philosopher of science. As a preliminary, §2 ascribes
the tendency to dismiss Dirac's methodological pronouncements to the
influence of logical positivism. §3 reconstructs Dirac's views about the
importance of aesthetic factors both as heuristic guides to research and as
evaluative criteria; in §§4 and 5 arguments are set out which might have led
Dirac to embrace the beliefs which he professed, and evidence from his
writings is adduced to suggest that he indeed reasoned along those lines.
The paper closes with a brief examination of some methodological implica-
tions of Dirac's views.
§ 2. The positivist treatment of aesthetic factors in science
Positivism established a demarcation between two contexts which, it was
alleged, the scientist's work traverses: an arational 'context of discovery' in
which theory-generation occurs by enigmatic intuitions or conjectures, and
4 Barrow, p. 1, 392, 1988b, Barrow further comments on Dirac's views on aesthetic criteria in
science in his, pp. 345-52, 1988a.
5 Simonton, p. 193, 1988.
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a 'context of justification' where inference from empirical data tests the
products of the former stage and assures the rationality of theory-succes-
sion.6 The distinction was voiced by, for instance, R.S. Rudner:
In general, the context of validation is the context of our concern when, regardless of how we have
come to discover or entertain a scientific hypothesis or theory, we raise questions about accepting or
rejecting it. To the context of discovery, on the other hand, belong such questions as how, in fact, one
conies to latch on to good hypotheses, or what social, psychological, political, or economic condi-
tions will conduce to thinking up fruitful hypotheses.7
Those who introduced the distinction between the context of discovery
and that of justification believed that philosophy consisted chiefly of the
study of logical relationships between propositions; in consequence, they
thought that all philosophical analysis of science ought to be directed at
processes of justification, and none to strategies of discovery.8 K.R. Popper
advocates both the distinction between contexts of discovery and of justifi-
cation and the positivist allotment of philosophical interest to the latter
term exclusively. Under the characteristic heading Elimination of Psycho-
logism he writes:
The initial stage, the act of conceiving or inventing a theory, seems to me neither to call for logical
analysis nor to be susceptible of it. [. . .] There is no such thing as a logical method of having new
ideas, or a logical reconstruction of this process. My view may be expressed by saying that every
discovery contains 'an irrational element', or 'a creative intuition', in Bergson's sense."
It is through statements of preference of this form that positivism dismisses
from rational attention the province of scientific discovery.
The aesthetic factors which operate in science are by most people in-
tuitively perceived as non-quantitative, non-empirical, imprecise and ara-
tional, of the same species as the 'psychological conditions' of scientific
thought of which Rudner speaks or the 'creative intuitions' of Popper.
Acting on this conviction, positivist philosophy of science first consigns
scientists' aesthetic references to the context of discovery, and secondly
presumes that as a consequence they are not susceptible to rational
analysis.10
' This distinction orginated with Reichenbach, pp. 6-7, 1938, though it was foreshadowed in certain
aspects by Herschel, p. 164, 1830. The history of the distinction and of criticism of it is retraced by
Hoyningcn-Hucnc, 1987.
7 Rudner, p. 6, 1966. The author's term 'validation' is a synonym of 'justification'.
* The differential allocation of interest was first endorsed by the originator of the modern version of
the discovery/justification distinction, Rcichenbach. p. 289, 1949: "The philosopher of science is not
much interested in the thought processes which lead to discovery."
' Popper, pp. 31-2, 1959.
10 Thus for instance Popper states that a consideration of elegance "has little interest from the point
of view of the theory of knowledge: it docs not fall within the province of logic, but merely indicates a
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One of the most comprehensive illustrations of the positivist attitude
towards aesthetic factors in science is offered by H. Feigl, who endorses the
denial in three stages of their philosophical interest. He first distinguishes
between studies of discovery and of validation:
The distinction ( . . . ) between the historicosociological narratives, analyses, causal accounts of the
origins, developments, conflicts, and Zeitgeists of scientific ideas on the one hand, and the logi-
comethodological reconstructions of scientific knowledge claims, on the other hand ( . . . ] . remains
(and, as I see it, should remain) at least a most important first approximation if we are to retain even a
minimum of clear thinking in these badly confused matters."
He initially betrays no preference among the modes of inquiry delineated in
this passage, but soon there remains no doubt which he believes holds
interest for the philosopher:
Consider, just as prime examples, the writings of Galileo and Newton. Their formulations usually
came 'after the fact' of their discoveries - experimental or theoretical. This is prototypical of all good
philosophy of science. In Newton's formulation of his assumptions (postulates), definitions (explica-
tions), and regulae philosophandi (precepts), we find one of the truly great masters giving us a
rational reconstruction of his theoretical achievements.n
Having characterized what he understands as 'good philosophy of science',
Feigl excludes from its domain the study of aesthetic factors, confining their
operation to the context of discovery where philosophy has no jurisdiction:
A few words on some misinterpretations stemming from predominant concern with the history and
especially the psychology of scientific knowledge. In the commendable (but possible Utopian)
endeavor to bring the 'two cultures' closer together (or to bridge the 'cleavage in our culture') the
more tender-minded thinkers have stressed how much the sciences and the arts have in common. The
'bridges' [. . . ] are passable only in regard to the psychological aspects of scientific [. . . ] creation
[. . .]. Certainly, there arc esthetic aspects of science [. . . j . B u t [ . . .] what is primary in the appraisal
of scientific knowledge claims is (at best) secondary in the evaluation of works of art - and vice
versa."
According to the positivist, then, the sole merit one may ascribe to aesthetic
intuitions is that of having a valuable heuristic role in the arational process
of theory-generation: they are barred from playing a part in
theory-evaluation.
preference of an aesthetic or pragmatic character" ibid, p. 137; emphasis in the original.
" Feigl, p. 4, 1970, emphasis in the original. After a so emphatic endorsement of one of the main
tenets of logical positivism it is surprising a few pages on to read an abjuration: "I personally
abandoned, long ago, whatever adherence I had to positivistic ( . . . ) philosophies of science", ibid, p.
7.
12 Ibid, p. 6; emphasis in the original.
" Ibid, pp. 9-10; emphasis in the original.
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It is most plausibly on the basis of this image of science that some
commentators are moved to dismiss Dirac's insistence that one should allot
an evaluative role to aesthetic criteria. Dirac's remarks, however, are
conceived from without the positivist view of science.
§ 3. The scope of operation of aesthetic criteria
A component of the positivists' view about aesthetic factors in scientific
methodology is the thesis that such factors operate only as heuristic guides
to research, in what they would term the 'context of discovery', and not as
criteria of theory-evaluation in the context of justification.
The positivists are undoubtedly correct in reporting an incidence of
aesthetic considerations in the context of discovery: it transpires from
historiography that scientists' decisions to expend work on the devel-
opment of a particular theory are frequently taken in part on the strength of
that theory's aesthetic features.14
Dirac for one admitted turning to aesthetic criteria in determining pri-
orities for his own research." He believed also that some scientists among
his contemporaries relied in part on aesthetic criteria in determining where
best to apply their efforts, and he recounts two episodes in which he
believes decisions to pursue a certain line of research were taken on the
strength of the aesthetic rather than of the empirical merits of the theories
concerned.
The first episode took place during Einstein's development of the general
theory of relativity:
When Einstein was working on building up his theory of gravitation he was not trying to account for
some results of observations. Far from it. His entire procedure was to search for a beautiful theory
[. . . ]. Somehow he got the idea of connecting gravitation with the curvature of space. He was able to
develop a mathematical scheme incorporating this idea. He was guided only by consideration of the
beauty of these equations. [. . .] The result of such a procedure is a theory of great simplicity and
elegance in its basic ideas."
The second episode in which, as Dirac believes, aesthetic considerations
took a hand in determining the direction of research unfolded during the
" Comments on the heuristic role of aesthetic factors may be found in Mamchur. 1987.
" As Krisch p. 51, 1987 reports. 'Dirac stated that, ". . . the elegance of the formulation was very
important in choosing the direction for one's research. " ' Dirac speaks further of the heuristic role of
the beauty of mathematical expressions in his 1982a.
16 Dirac, p. 44, 1980o, Chandrasekhar. pp. 52-5, 1988, expresses doubts that in his search lor a




development of quantum mechanics in the years after 1925. In the following
passage Dirac contrasts the style of work of E. Schrödinger with that of W.
Heisenberg, who a short time previously had enunciated a matrix formula-
tion of the theory:
Heisenberg worked keeping close to the experimental evidence about spectra |. . .]. Schrödinger
worked from a more mathematical point of view, trying to find a beautiful theory for describing
atomic events [. . .]. He was able to extend De Brogue's ideas and to get a very beautiful equation,
known as Schrödinger's wave equation, for describing atomic processes. Schrödinger got this
equation by pure thought, looking for some beautiful generalization of De Brogue's ideas, and not by
keeping close to the experimental development of the subject in the way Heisenberg did.17
These two historiographie accounts lend themselves easily to incorpora-
tion into the positivist view of science. After all, it is a tenet of the positivist
view of methodology that scientists are both liable and entitled to draw
upon sources of arational inspiration in their effort to generate hypotheses
later to be tested by empirical means. Dirac's narratives above may be
interpreted as accounts of cases in which the arational mental processes of
scientists engaged in hypothesis-generation were prompted or inspired by
aesthetic imagery rather than by any other particular psychological motif.
However, Dirac's image of science enters into conflict with the positivist
model when he turns to discuss the good-making requirements of theories.
Positivists hold firm views about which criteria ought to be employed in
theory-evaluation: they believe that the merits attributed to a theory ought
to depend exclusively upon its relationship with empirical data, and hence
that the sole evaluative criteria admissible in science are logical-empirical.
On this view, a theory will be judged on its internal consistency, the
accuracy of its predictions, the breadth of its explanatory scope, and per-
haps on certain other similar criteria, but not on its possession of any
extra-empirical virtues, such as metaphysical or aesthetic qualities.
Dirac dissents: he believes that aesthetic factors take a hand not only in
directing processes of theory-formulation, but also in contributing to the
assessment of the theories which have thereby been generated.18 He left
many assertions to this effect, the more univocal of which are cited in the
remainder of this paper; one may ponder upon a statement he made in
Moscow in 1955 as an initial indication of his views. As R.H. Dalitz
17 Dirac, pp. 46-7, 1963. A detailed historical account of the rise of wave mechanics is offered in
Miller, pp. 125-83, 1984.
" Some further considerations about the basis of the evaluative use of aesthetic criteria in science are
contained in my (1989).
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recounts, 'When asked to write briefly his philosophy of physics, he wrote
on the blackboard "PHYSICAL LAWS SHOULD HAVE MATHEMATICAL BEAU-
TY" and this has been preserved there to this day'.19 It was at least in part on
such a criterion that Dirac extended support to the general theory of
relativity:
The foundations of the theory are, I believe, stronger than what one could get simply from the
support of experimental evidence. The real foundations come from the great beauty of the theory.
[. . .] It is the essential beauty of the theory which I feel is the real reason for believing in it.2"
Thus, while positivists admit that aesthetic factors may play a part in the
context of discovery, but deny their legitimacy in the context of justifica-
tion, Dirac appears to believe that the procedures typical of both stages may
make recourse to aesthetic considerations. By what arguments, the posi-
tivist will ask, can such a view be supported?
§ 4. Aesthetic criteria in theory-endorsement
In certain models of science, it is not invariably justified to reject a theory
of which an empircal test has delivered what on a prima facie view is an
unfavorable verdict. P. Duhem and W.V. Quine have suggested that the
entity which is put to the test in an experiment or other empirical trial is not
an isolated proposition or theory, but rather an extended theoretical corpus
or conjunction of theories. Quine maintains that the object at issue in a
scientist's empirical test is the overall body of his or her beliefs, drawn from
all fields of science, logic and mathematics, and including common-sense
beliefs. An unfavorable empirical result does not militate against a single
theory within this whole, not even against the individual theory which may
purportedly be at jeopardy: rather, such a result counts against the legiti-
macy of one's holding to the overall body of beliefs which entered into the
test. One may harmonize such a result with any particular theory - even the
" Dalitz, p. 20, 1987. This story is told also in Dalitz and Pcicrls. p. 159. 1986.
21 Dirac, p. 10, 1980fe. The view that part of the support to which the general theory of relativity is
entitled derives from the theory's aesthetic qualities is widespread. A.M. Taylor, for instance, writes
that 'the elegant beauty of the theoretical edifice [of general relativity] is thought sufficient reason for
believing it to be true', p. 38, 1966. Bergmann, p. 30.1982. too supports Dirac's view, attributing the
diffusion of Einstein's general theory of relativity jointly to empirical and aesthetic factors: "From a
logical point of view, the progress toward general relativity depended on a number of choices to be
made; its eventual adoption, first by Einstein himself and later by the community of physicists,
depended on the esthetic appeal of the finished theory and on its confirmation by experiment and
observation." A further appraisal of the aesthetic properties of the theory of general relativity is
contained in Chandrasckhar pp. 148-55, 1987.
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one which was allegedly at issue - by introducing into some other compo-
nent of the overall body of beliefs alterations sufficient to return the body to
consistency with the sum of empirical data collected.21 Duhem's view, while
similar to that of Quine, denies that the result of logic or mathematics are
susceptible to revision by appeal to experience in the way which Quine
allows: nonetheless, for Duhem too the whole of empirical science hangs in
the balance in an experiment which purports to test an individual theory
within it.22
On this view, the amount of information carried by the report of an
unfavorable experimental outcome is sharply reduced. The unfavorable
outcome of an empirical test now condemns not an isolated theory but a
conjunction of theories: it informs us that a certain conjunction is false but
does not indicate in which conjunct the error resides.
It is not necessary to embrace Duhem and Quine's holistic view of
theory-assessment to be persuaded that unfavorable experimental out-
comes do not militate against isolated theories. Many a substantive theory
in the physical sciences is of too high a degree of generality to issue any
determinate empirical predictions except in conjunction with some auxilia-
ry or subsidiary hypotheses. Any purported test of such a theory is in reality
a test of the conjunction of the theory and of the auxiliary hypotheses which
have been bound to it. A conflict between this conjunction and the data
implies that the conjunction as a whole is empirically inadequate, but fails
to retrace the inadequacy to any particular conjunct: the experimental
discrepancy may be explained by the assertion that the theory is in error,
but equally by the assertion that the theory is true or close to the truth, the
error lying in some other conjunct, one of the auxiliary hypotheses.23
On this more modest supposition as well as in the scenario envisaged by
Duhem and Quine, an unfavorable empirical result is an insufficient base
upon which to ground the determinate verdict that a particular theory is
invalid: the scientist must look, as the source of such sufficient grounds, to
criteria other than the verdict of experiment.
There is considerable evidence both that Dirac was aware of this limita-
tion on the determinancy of the verdicts delivered by unfavorable empirical
" Quine, 1951.
n Duhem, pp. 180-90, 1906.
23 The implications of this eventuality for theory-assessment are examined bye. g. Lakatos.p. 100-2,
1970.
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results, and that he thought that to overcome this limitation scientists
should make recourse to aesthetic evaluations of theories. His discussion of
the merits of the general theory of relativity illustrates his beliefs in this
regard. First of all he judges, as the previous section intimated, that there
are reasons for which to embrace the theory other than the degree of its
consonance with empirical data:
One has a great confidence in the theory arising from its great beauty, quite independent of its
detailed successes. [. . .] One has an overpowering belief that its foundations must be correct quite
independent of its agreement with observation.24
If one believed that, independently of its empirical virtues, the aesthetic
features of a theory were able to warrant such confidence in its basic
validity, it would be natural to turn to aesthetic criteria to determine
whether one should meet a prima facie unfavorable empirical result by
abandoning the theory itself or alternatively by doubting the auxiliary
hypotheses which accompanied the theory in its trial.
This is just the use to which Dirac supposes that aesthetic criteria may be
put. He muses on the eventuality that the general theory of relativity might
in its early days have received an infavorable empirical verdict:
Suppose a discrepancy had appeared, well confirmed and substantiated, between the theory and
observations.). . . ] Should one then consider the theory wrong?). . .] I would say that the answer to
the last question is emphatically No. [. . .] Anyone who appreciates the fundamental harmony
connecting the way Nature runs and general mathematical principles must feel that a theory with the
beauty and elegance of Einstein's theory has to be substantially correct. If a discrepancy should
appear in some application of the theory, it must be caused by some secondary feature relating to this
application which has not been adequately taken into account, and not by a failure of the general
principles of the theory.25
Dirac thus believes that an evaluation on aesthetic criteria can reveal the
substantial truth of a theory which - on account of, say, having faced its
experimental test in conj unction with inadequate auxiliary hypotheses - has
received a prima facie unfavorable empirical verdict. If aesthetic eval-
uations indeed possessed this power, it would clearly be warranted on some
occasions to maintain allegiance to a theory - overruling an unfavorable
empirical verdict which it had supposedly received - by appeal to its
favorable aesthetic evaluation.
24 Dirac, p. 44, 1980a.
23 Ibid., pp. 43-4; emphasis in the original.
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The belief that a theory may be retained in the face of unfavorable
empirical results if it possesses qualities perceived otherwise than via empir-
ical testing is manifested by many scientists, among whom was Einstein.26
As did Dirac, Einstein attributed great importance to the aesthetic features
of theories.27 Perhaps, therefore, Einstein believed like Dirac that it is to
aesthetic criteria that one should appeal in justifying the retention of a
theory which has encountered an unfavorable empirical outcome. Certain-
ly this is the view which appears to be read in Einstein by Dirac: 'Einstein
seemed to feel that beauty in the mathematical foundation was more
important, in a very fundamental way, than getting agreement with
observation.'28
§ 5. Aesthetic criteria in theory-rejection
If, for the reasons displayed in the previous section, it is sometimes
warranted to retain allegiance to a theory despite its notionally having
failed some empirical test, one is at other times justified in withholding
allegiance from a theory which has apparently demonstrated predictive
adequacy by passing such a test. After all, true conclusions can be entailed
by valid arguments from false premises: therefore some theories which
have passed their empirical tests ought nonetheless - if only one knew - to
be rejected.
The decision to overrule the verdict issued by experimental tests and
reject such theories clearly cannot be justified by further appeal to empir-
ical criteria of theory-evaluation: such theories have, by hypothesis, satis-
fied the empirical tests to which they were subjected, so the application of
any such criteria would serve to heighten rather than lessen the degree of
one's allegiance to the theory. The decision to overrule an empirical verdict
must instead be prompted by the application of some additional, extra-
empirical evaluative criteria. The obligation upon those methodologists
who wish to reserve the faculty to overrule the verdicts of empirical tests
M Roscnthal-Schneider, p. 523, 1980, tells of the now famous episode in which Einstein manifested
confidence in the validity of the general theory of relativity regardless of the outcome of observations
performed on Eddington's eclipse expedition.
27 For evidence of Einstein's views on the aesthetic properties of theories, sec e.g. Whitrow (Ed.),
pp. 19, 82, 1967.
a Dirac, p. 83, 1982fe.
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and reject theories which appear to have scored an empirical success is to
indicate to which extra-empirical criteria they propose to this end to make
recourse. Dirac offered a distinctive solution to this problem: he believed
that theories which have so far enjoyed empirical success may nonetheless
be condemned on the grounds of their being aesthetically displeasing.
Dirac's view in this matter becomes apparent in his reflections on the
merits of quantum electrodynamics. This theory numbered at the time - as
it does now - among the empirically most successful modern accounts of a
body of experimentanl data: it gives values for such physical quantities as
the Lamb shift and the anomalous magnetic moment of the electron which
agree wth measurement within the bounds of experimental accuracy, which
amounts to a few parts per million. However, quantum electrodynamics
yields these outstanding predictive results only after certain infinities,
which during calculations appear in the values attributed to the electron
mass and charge, are excised by a mathematical procedure developed by
J. Schwinger, R.P. Feynman and others, and named 'finite
renormalization'.29
Because of the necessity of applying renormalization procedures in its
interpretation, quantum electrodynamics struck and continues to strike
many physicists as aesthetically displeasing: Dirac was among those who
refused on these grounds to accept it. He manifested no reservation about
its ability to account for experimental data; his scepticism was concerned
entirely with what he considered to be the unacceptable inelegance of the
manipulation necessary to draw from it determinate predictions. He ex-
pressly noted in quantum electrodynamics the cohabitation of empirical
virtues and aesthetic shortcomings, and directed his repeated criticism
exclusively to the latter features of the theory. He wrote in a formulation
typical of his concerns:
Recent work by Lamb, Schwinger. Feynman and others has been very successful (. . .] but the
resulting theory is an ugly and incomplete one, and canot be considered as a satisfactory solution of
the problem of the electron.10
29 Accounts of the development of quantum electrodynamics, of the introduction of the renormali-
zation procedure and of its empirical successes are given by Weinberg, pp. 21-30, 1977. Aramaki
(1987), and Schwinger (1989).
30 Dirac, p. 291, 1951, Shanmugadhasan. p. 53, 1987, tells of an episode in which Dirac issued a
similar judgment of the theory: he writes that in 1945 Dirac 'emphasized that he did not believe his
quantum electrodynamics was the right theory because it was so complicated and ugly.'
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Quantum electrodynamics was not the sole theory to meet Dirac's dis-
pleasure on aesthetic grounds independently of the degree of empirical
success which it had demonstrated. For instance, Dirac unfavorably rated
the non-linear spinor theory of Heisenberg on a blatantly aesthetic canon:
'My main objection to your work is that I do not think your basic (non-
linear field) equation has sufficient mathematical beauty to be a funda-
mental equation of physics.'31
In such cases aesthetic evaluative criteria seem in Dirac's mind to acquire
the power to discern the truth-value of theories which have only fortuitous-
ly satisfied the empirical criteria applied to it. Just as in his view aesthetic
criteria can preserve a good theory from refutation in the face of apparently
unfavorable empirical results, so they can prompt the abandonment or at
least the mistrust of a theory of which the empirical track-record is as yet
satisfactory.
The previous section concluded with the suggestion that there was some
affinity between the views of Dirac and of Einstein on the wisdom of
retaining allegiance to an aesthetically pleasing theory regardless of any
temporary empirical failings on its part. Einstein seems to have shared also
something of the view of Dirac's explored in the present section: he too
seems to have found it natural to harbor suspicion on aesthetic grounds
against theories which had demonstrated empirical competence. In his long
resistance to quantum mechanics, for instance, Einstein never failed to pay
tribute to the theory's predictive accuracy and power, but repeatedly ex-
pressed reservations about its acceptability on the strength of the quasi-
aesthetic unease which it caused in him.32
The response of Dirac to the observation that empirically-successful
theories may nonetheless be false, and that therefore empirical criteria
alone are insufficient to indicate which theories ought to be rejected, bears
similarity also to the solution given classically in natural philosophy. That
true conclusions may follow by valid arguments from false premises was
well known to Aristotelian scholasticism, which in response founded a
distinction between a 'thesis' and a 'hypothesis'. A hypothesis was a set of
" Quoted in Brown and Rechenberg, p. 148, 1987. The passage is contained in a letter of Dirac of
March 1967.
" For evidence of the quasi-aesthetic nature of Einstein's resistance to quantum mechanics see e.g.
Hoffman, p. 195, 1972.
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propositions able to save the phenomena of a certain domain, i.e. able
successfully to predict the results of certain observations; it was not neces-
sarily true. A thesis consisted of a theorem established - in the Aristotelian
sense - 'scientifically', or validly deduced from evident first principles and
thus indubitably true. The adequancy of a hypothesis was gauged by appeal
to empirical criteria, but clearly these would have been on their own
insufficient to identify satisfactory theses. For this task a supplementary set
of evaluative criteria, of extra-empirical nature, was required: a satisfactory
thesis was detected in part by, say, its consistency with scripture.33 While the
set of supplementary criteria envisaged by twentieth-century physicists is
different from that of Aristotelian scholastics, it is interesting to see solu-
tions of the same form being proposed, at an interval of several centuries for
the same methodological problem.
§ 6. Summary and implications
It transpires from a careful reading of Dirac's arguments, notwithstand-
ing the doubts expressed by Barrow and Simonton, not only that he genui-
nely proposed that scientists should subject theories to aesthetic eval-
uations, but also that he perceived cogent reasons for so doing. He appears
to have been motivated by an understanding of the limitations of empirical
criteria of theory-assessment, and of the scientist's frequent practical need
to make recourse to a supplementary set of evaluative criteria in order to
decide choices among competing theories.
Of course, the methodologist who wishes to develop Dirac's theory of the
role of aesthetic criteria has yet many questions to answer. Chief among
these is, what justification can be adduced for turning to aesthetic criteria
rather than to any other set of extra-empirical criteria in hoping to settle
cases of theory-choice?
One may envisage two possible answers to this. It may be that some a
priori reason could be discerned for believing that theories which exhibit
certain aesthetic features are ceteris paribus more likely to be true than
theories of different aesthetic form; this belief might descend, for instance,
from the assumption that the natural world itself possesses a certain aes-
" An account of the cpistcmological debates concerning the use of hypotheses and of theses in
Renaissance astronomy is contained in Jardine, pp. 697-702, 1988.
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thetic form. Alternatively, one might imagine casting an inductive eye over
the history of science and establishing that theories demonstrating certain
aesthetic features had as a matter of contingent fact tended to be closer to
the truth - as this was later revealed - than other theories. While each of
these routes offers some prospect for grounding Dirac's methodological
injunctions at a deeper conceptual level, it seems that Dirac developed
neither systematically himself.
Those sceptical of the worth of Dirac's remarks on the role of aesthetic
evaluative criteria, perhaps believing that a theory's beauty is apprehended
- if at all - by a purely subjective process unsusceptible to rational analysis,
have concluded that they must therefore not have been intended, or at any
rate must be taken, as serious contributions to a model of scientific metho-
dology. If displayed as an honest and thoughtful response to certain well-
known methodological problems, however, Dirac's remarks on the role of
aesthetic criteria in theory-evaluation appear to assume more rational sense
than his fiercest critics might allow. Dirac's critics can question, perhaps,
his choice to make recourse to aesthetic criteria rather than any other, but
they too - if they propose to compile a convincing portfolio of scientists'
evaluative procedures - will be compelled to face in some way or other the
problems deriving from the limitations of empiricism.34
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